Philosophy in Times of Regression by Veljak, Lino
DIALOGUE AND UNIVERSALISM 
No. 2/2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lino Veljak 
 
 
 
PHILOSOPHY IN TIMES OF REGRESSION 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper the author tries to explore (or at least to indicate) the problem of the so-
cial function of philosophy in the contemporary world. This world is characterized by 
universal modernization and in the last decades by globalization and unification, but at 
the same time also by controversies and contradictions which reveal tendencies of hu-
man regression and degeneration. Philosophy must remain a study of general and fun-
damental nature of a human-produced world. As such philosophy produces potentialiti-
ess of critical thinking, provides social investigations, and—at least in principle—gives 
people the power of an adequate understanding of our world, its fundamental character-
istics and main tendencies. Thus philosophy is a ground for a reasonable social practice 
and adequate policies. 
Keywords: social function of philosophy, contemporary era, modernization, regres-
sion, high education, social practice 
 
 
INTRODUCTORY CLARIFICATIONS 
 
The problem on the function and purpose of philosophy in the human world 
is an over-elaborated topic of contemporary philosophy. However, it seems that 
the question about the social function and social responsibility of philosophy 
forms a necessary ground for the self-reflection of philosophy and for settling 
the sense of philosophy, undoubtedly of social philosophy, if not of the philoso-
phy as a whole. 
At the beginning of the reflection it is necessary to clarify some central no-
tions relevant for our exposition. These are: philosophy, regression, our time.  
The main problem of this reflection may be formulated as follows: What is 
or what can philosophy do? Why we are speaking about our times as the times 
of regression? And, perhaps most important: what philosophy may do in our 
times? 
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PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Philosophy? We know that philosophy can be defined as a study of ideas 
about knowledge, truth, the nature and meaning of life, as a particular set of 
such ideas,1 etc. I prefer to say: philosophy is a study about the the nature and 
meaning of being, including especially the human being, or a study about the 
nature and the world understood primarily as the human world or human-made 
world. Moreover, philosophy could be defined as a set of ideas about how to do 
something and how to live. Philosophy could also be defined as a pursuit of 
wisdom, or as a love of wisdom—as it was understood in most of ancient phi-
losophical traditions. Somebody is a philosopher (better: somebody can be un-
derstood and recognized as a philosopher) if he/ she is a friend of wisdom, a 
lover of truth, etc. 
 But those ancient definitions of philosophy and the essence or nature of phi-
losophers are not adequate in modern times; they cannot explain what actually 
philosophy represents, what is its significance or what it could become. If we 
want to understand the sense, relevance and possible impact of philosophy in 
the contemporary world, we necessarily must examine the essential characteris-
tics and tendencies of the world in the period of globalization. Philosophy could 
be a simple private activity of isolated and alienated individuals, but such phi-
losophy cannot pretend to possess any significant and relevant influnce on the 
world. Because of that, it would be plausible to concentrate our analysis only on 
the nature and tendencies in the contemporary world.  
 
 
OUR TIMES 
 
 Here we arrive at the notion of our times as times of regression. Namely, the 
concentration of the analysis of the nature and tendencies in the contemporary 
world could be formulated by use of the question concerning the definition of 
our times as the times of regression. A direct consequence of the valuation of 
our times as times of regression is the evaluation of our contemporary world as 
a world in the process of regression. But, can anybody really approve such an 
evaluation of our world? Through several past centuries the humankind was 
living in the period of the universal (scientific, technological, social, and maybe 
political) progress. 
 People say and a great number of the mainstream scholars agree: we are liv-
ing in the times in which the world became increasingly better due to science, 
————————— 
1
 Cfr. Merriam-Webster Dictionary (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/philo-
sophy.htm. Naturally, philosophy is a product of philosopher’s efforts. We can find a very attrac-
tive definition of the philosopher’s nature in popular Durant’s overview of philosophy: “A phi-
losopher […] has […a] structure of thought unified by a purpose for his own life and for man-
kind” (Durant, 1953, 141).  
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technology, modernization, liberty, freedom, democracy and the quality of life. 
So, we are living in the age of an universal progress. That means: the scientific 
and technological progress determines all other dimensions of the universal 
human progress, and leads humankind to better human conditions, i. e. to free-
dom, good life and happiness. 
According to Karl R. Popper, the wrong view of science betrays itself in the 
craving to be right: for it is not the possession of knowledge of irrefutable truth 
that makes men scientists, but their persistent and critical search for truth. 
Through scientific advances and their application in the field of technology and 
social organization, humankind produces an improvement of the human condi-
tion (Popper, 2002). Technology offers conditions for the economic develop-
ment and increase of global wealth. Because of that humankind is living in the 
period of modernization (i.e. industrialization, urbanization and rationalization). 
Thanks to modernization we are becoming wealthier and more powerful, as 
citizens we are freer to enjoy higher standards of living. Developing new tech-
nologies and the need to update traditional methods of transportation, commu-
nications and production make modernization necessary or at least preferable to 
the status quo. Modernization is linked to an overreaching process of rationali-
zation. It is a process of the replacement of traditions, values, and emotions as 
motivators of behavior in society with rational, calculated ones. Rationalization 
refers to the process of replacing societies' current values, traditions and emo-
tions that motivate the current behaviors of their members, with thoughts and 
activities which appear to be more rational. 
 
 
CONTRADICTIONS AND CONTROVERSIES 
 
 Instead of uncritically adopting such an unlimited optimistic view there 
would be needed to ask: can really (and necessary) the described type of ration-
alization produce better human conditions in the new, rationalized and modern-
ized world? Some most important contemporary thinkers can give us relevant 
indications concerning possible answers to that question. Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor W. Adorno formulated in their famous book on the Enlightenment 
(Horkheimer, Adorno, 1972) main internal contradictions of modernity and 
progress. According to them, the process of progress (the modernization based 
on the tradition of the Enlightenment) has its dark side: while trying to abolish 
old superstitions and myths, the Enlightenment ignored its own foundation. Its 
strivings towards totality and certainty led to an increasing instrumentalization 
of reason: the real basis of rationalization is the instrumental reason. But, more 
than that: in the period of the globalization of such rationalization, the rationali-
zation must be connected with commodity fetishism2 and with modern forms of 
consumption. 
————————— 
2
 The classical definition of this notion gave Karl Marx (Marx 1962, 107). 
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 As a good example we can take into account the typical process of rationali-
zation in the globalized food consumption. Fast-food restaurants designed to 
maximize profit have strived toward total efficiency since their inception.  
A high level of efficiency has been accomplished in several ways, including  
a stronger control of workers, the replacement of more complicated systems 
with simpler, less time-consuming ones, simple numbered systems of the value 
of meals and the addition of drive-through windows. Should the globalized  
rationalization in the terms of increase of efficiency, calculability, predictability 
(or standardization) and control be valued as an evidence of human progression 
or global regression? The question is open; the possible answers depend on the 
solution of the fundamental issue: what may be valuated as good and what is the 
basic criterion of such valuation? 
 Hannah Arendt in her book The Origins of Totalitarianism (Arendt, 1951) 
argues that the barbarian phenomena and barbarian episodes (like the Holo-
caust) in the modern world are deeply connected to modernity and its order-
making efforts. In a similar sense Zygmunt Bauman argues that rationalization 
as a attribute of modernity is closely associated with the events of the Holocaust 
(Bauman, 1989). He investigates the different approaches which modern society 
adopts toward the stranger. The stranger cannot be controlled and ordered and 
as such he/she is always the object of fear; a potential mugger, a person beoynd 
society's borders, constantly threatening. Bauman claims that the Holocaust 
should not simply be considered an event in the Jewish history, nor a regression 
to pre-modern barbarism. On the contrary, the Holocaust should be seen as 
deeply connected to the essence of the modern world. Procedural rationality, the 
division of labour into small tasks, the taxonomic categorization of different 
species, and the tendency to view the following of the rules as morally good, all 
played their role in the Holocaust. For this reason, according to Bauman, mod-
ern societies have not fully learned the lessons of the Holocaust. Could this 
argumentation be used as a proof of the thesis claiming that we are now living 
in the times of human regression? 
Marek Siemek, an important Polish philosopher, in his books Democracy 
and Philosophy and Reason and Intersubjectivity (Siemek, 1999; 2000) as well 
as in other publications (Siemek, 1985; 1994; 1996) presents—basing on his 
original transcendental social philosophy, inspired by Hegel's thought—other 
evidences and arguments on the over-evaluation of our times. 
It can be argued that instead of critical evaluations of the progression of 
modernization and globalization it would be reasonable to emphasize positive 
sides of this processes. The progress in education may be seen as its positive 
feature. In modern times the illiteracy was practically vanished, at least in the 
developed western countries, and the high education has become much more 
common than earlier. The research concerning Great Britain presented by  
Richard F. Gombrich, a distinguished fellow of Balliol College at the University 
of Oxford, may be used as a clear example: In 1961, 5% of young people in 
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Britain received higher education; in 1997 the percentage was 34%, and the 
government’s declared policy is to raise it to 50%. Over the last twenty years 
the number of students has more than doubled” (Gombrich, 2013, 10), more 
exactly: the number of the full-time students in British higher education was in 
1960 just under 200,000, in 1970—just over 400,000, 1980—almost the same, 
1990—about 650,000, 1997—about 1,160,000 (Gombrich, 2013, 24), but 
“while the unit of funding per student (known as ‘unit of resource’) has fallen 
by 40% and is still falling: the government has announced plans to cut it by 
0,8% in the current year and 0,9% in each of the next two years” (Gombrich, 
2013, 10). 
 
The progress in high education reveals also its own black side. Namely, accord-
ing to Gombrich, the British high education (like education in all the world):  
 
“There is a fashionable argument which says that since knowledge these 
days is changing faster than ever before, our educational institutions, which 
are there to impart that knowledge, must be ready to change just as fast. As it 
stands, this is silly. The ability to change the content of a course has few  
if any further implications. Yes, there are subjects which are moving so fast 
that at university level what is thought may constantly to be revised.  
I suspect that all these subjects are scientific. Their existence does not, how-
ever, mean that the idea of mastering a body of knowledge is obsolete. Mas-
tering of a body of knowledge is akin to mastering a skill, and is an equally 
valuable and satisfying experience. Anyone who is not given that experience 
while growing up, preferably several times over, has in my view been de-
prived of a proper education and a chance to make full use of their mind. 
Nor does this deprive only the individuals most concerned. In our society 
common knowledge is being reduced to knowledge about sport, pop music, 
film stars and TV personalities. There is nothing wrong with knowing about 
those things, but a society in which members share knowledge about nothing 
else is desperately impoverished and lacks an important force for cohesion; it 
is on the way to not having the common language.” (Gombrich, 2013a, 34) 
 
How we could evaluate the evident progress (like the progress in the field of 
education, one of the better sides of humankind's general progress) which re-
sults in the infantilization of the common language and common sense? Could 
we find another argument for the thesis claiming that humankind is now in the 
process of radical regression? If the answer is affirmative, it is necessary to put 
the question about grounds of such degenerative processes. The troubles with 
high education are not in the first place—as it seems at first sight and as Gom-
brich argues—produced by relevant government's policies. The regression and 
the degenerative processes (not only in the field of education) are consequences 
of the dominating logic determined by the primacy of instrumental reason serv-
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ing the profit. Because of that, instead of a better world the modernization and 
globalization based on the instrumental reason generates the world which in-
cludes radical and unsupportable contradictions (i.e. for example the contradic-
tions between riches and poverty)3 and in which a false common sense by the 
use of mainstream media and mainstream (especially privatized) education pro-
duces the reduction of human faculties and powers in different fields of human 
individual and social life. 
 Our times since the 19th century are determined by the industrial revolution, 
modernization and (evidently since the last years of the 20th century) the eco-
nomical and cultural globalization and unification of the world. These times are 
characterized by growing contradictions and contradictory processes of progress 
and degeneration.  
 
WHAT WITH PHILOSOPHY? 
 
What philosophy may and can do in these circumstances? A good candidate 
for an adequate answer is given by different contemporary thinkers. According 
to them, philosophy in our world must be concentrated on the issue of responsi-
bility, 4 more precisely, of the specific philosophical responsibility. How phi-
losophers can be responsible? The answer is: it is possible through philoso-
phers’ devotion to the essence of their real task, consisting in producing phi-
losophical thinking. Philosophy must remain a study of the general and funda-
mental nature of the world, more precisely, a study of our human-produced 
world, never a study of an abstract world. That is possible only if philosophy 
produce critical thinking: the thinking based on the differentiation between truth 
and falsehood, between good and unacceptable, between right and wrong, be-
tween human and inhuman. Due to possibilities of critical thinking such phi-
losophy can provide the social investigations and—at least in principle, as an 
open chance—can give the common people the power of adequate understand-
ing of our world, its fundamental characteristics and main tendencies which can 
produce grounds for reasonable social practice and for adequate policies. That is 
the way in which the true philosophers can remain responsible and dignified 
human beings. 
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